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I. Introduction 
 
Hitherto, criminal liability only attached to, inter alia, the commercial manufacture, 
importation, distribution and sale of infringing copies of copyright material.1  In the non-
commercial context, it was also a criminal offence to distribute infringing materials that 
had a prejudicial impact on the copyright owner.2  The defendant therefore could not be 
subject to criminal prosecution for infringing acts that were not motivated by profit or 
that did not involve “prejudicial” distribution.  Only civil liability attached to copyright 
infringements for what may be loosely termed “non-commercial” purposes.  All this, of 
course, changed when the United States–Singapore Free Trade Agreement (USSFTA) 
was concluded in May 2003 and when the Copyright (Amendment) Act 2004 was passed 
to implement the obligations set out in the IP Chapter (Chapter 16) of the USSFTA.  The 
amendments to the Singapore Copyright Act 1987 came into effect on 1 January 2005 
and a new section 136(3A) was born, the effect of which will be examined in greater 
detail below. 
 
 Copyright piracy is not by any means a new phenomenon.  For a long time, 
consumers the world over knew how to physically acquire pirated copies of copyright 
material (whether in music, film, software or computer games) from illegal vendors.  
Even though these consumers had obtained pirated (as opposed to legitimate) material, 
they could enjoy and use such products without having to make an additional copy, hence 
excluding them from copyright liability.  This popular practice may be frowned upon as 
immoral or unethical but it attracted no liability in copyright insofar as consumers were 
concerned, which probably explains why criminal liability and enforcement in the 
terrestrial world had always centered on copyright pirates (or secondary infringers of 
copyright) who exploit infringing material for commercial purposes.  However, 
consumers of online entertainment encounter a different scenario altogether because such 
products operate differently in the digital environment.  To avail themselves of online 
material, users invariably have to make a copy of the material in question (legitimate or 
otherwise).  In short, online use requires copying, a consequence which therefore creates 
a host of complications in the field of copyright liability.  Copyright owners now have 
locus standi – pursuant to section 136(3A) – to extend their realm of enforcement 
(beyond secondary copyright infringers and, indeed, those entities whose equipment and 
facilities are regarded as having facilitated these acts of infringement) to include online 
users of infringing material in the private and non-commercial context. 
 
 Initially, though, a measure of tolerance was extended in respect of online 
activities carried out by private individuals for personal and non-commercial purposes.  
Private copying by Internet users remained at relatively “comfortable” levels.  This is, of 
course, no longer the case today.  Advancements in information technology (and, in 
particular, the introduction of broadband technology) have led to a rapid and significant 
increase in the levels of online piracy.  Illegal online activities such as uploading, 
                                                 
1
 See, generally, section 136 of the Singapore Copyright Act 1987 (and, in particular, sections 136(1), (2) 
and (3)). Cf. section 107 UK CDPA 1988. 
2
 See section 136(3)(b) of the Singapore Copyright Act 1987. Cf. section 107(1)(e) UK CDPA 1988. 
 3 
downloading and file-sharing could no longer be safely tolerated, let alone ignored.3  
Such forms of activity, which were becoming more rampant by the day and had reached 
an extent unimaginable a quarter of a century ago, began to pose a real threat to the 
economic value of copyright.  For reasons unbeknown to this author, there also appears to 
be a misconception, particularly amongst the younger generation, that content on the 
Internet can be obtained and shared for free.  This explains why the notion of exclusive 
rights (which falls within the purview of copyright law) fits so uncomfortably in a shared 
resource such as the Internet.  There is indeed no social stigma associated with illegal 
file-sharing and downloading, unlike, say, stealing a CD/DVD from Borders.  In the face 
of such developments and online mentality, what enforcement action can copyright 
owners take to safeguard their economic interests?  Let us turn to an analysis of section 
136(3A) of the Singapore Copyright Act 1987. 
 
 
II. How does Section 136(3A) Compare with Like Provisions in Other Jurisdictions? 
 
It is appropriate, at this juncture, to set out section 136(3A) in its entirety:4 
 
“Where, at any time when copyright subsists in a work – 
(a) a person does any act that constitutes an infringement of the copyright 
in a work …; 
(b) the infringement of the copyright in the work by the person is wilful; 
and 
(c) either or both of the following apply: 
(i) the extent of the infringement is significant; 
(ii) the person does the act to obtain a commercial advantage, 
the person shall be guilty of an offence and shall be liable on conviction to a fine 
not exceeding $20,000 or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months or 
to both and, in the case of a second or subsequent offence, to a fine not exceeding 
$50,000 or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 3 years or to both.” 
 
It is immediately apparent that Singapore’s copyright legislation has now extended 
criminal liability to copyright infringements of a ‘wilful’ nature and where the extent of 
the infringement is ‘significant’.5  This particular aspect of the offence in section 136(3A) 
– which provides for TRIPS-plus standards of copyright protection6 – is rooted on the 
                                                 
3
 The problem of large-scale copyright infringement, particularly as regards music piracy, is not a new one. 
For a lesson in history that dates back to the dawn of the 20th century, see I Alexander, “Criminalising 
Copyright: A Story of Publishers, Pirates and Pieces of Eight” [2007] 66(3) Cambridge Law Journal 625. 
For a historical analysis from the US perspective, see J Hughes, “Copyright and Incomplete 
Historiographies: Of Piracy, Propertization, and Thomas Jefferson” (2005-2006) 79(5) Southern California 
Law Review 993. 
4
 Section 136(3A) of the Singapore Copyright Act 1987 (emphasis added). 
5
 Section 136(6A) of the Singapore Copyright Act 1987 states that “… in determining whether the extent of 
the infringement is significant, the court shall have regard to – (a) the volume of any articles that are 
infringing copies; (b) the value of any articles that are infringing copies; (c) whether the infringement has a 
substantial prejudicial impact on the owner of the copyright; and (d) all other relevant matters.” 
6
 Cf. Article 61 of the TRIPS Agreement 1994 – “Members shall provide for criminal procedures and 
penalties to be applied at least in cases of wilful … copyright piracy on a commercial scale”. 
 4 
causation of ‘significant’ economic harm to the copyright owner (a point to which we 
will return below), rather than on the commercial motives of the copyright infringer.  The 
copyright owner’s potential monetary loss may be the result of a slew of infringing 
activity, but this paper will, in line with the legislative intent of section 136(3A), focus 
principally on the activities of copyright infringers in the digital environment (such as the 
uploading and downloading of infringing files). 
 
Given that the impetus for enacting section 136(3A) was a consequence of 
Singapore’s obligations under the USSFTA, the drafters of the provision would 
inevitably have consulted section 506(a)(1) of the US Copyright Act 1976.7  There are, of 
course, some structural differences between the two provisions, but what is important for 
our purposes is that the US provision (in particular, limb (B)) similarly allows for the 
prosecution of individuals where the infringement in question was not committed for 
‘commercial advantage’ or ‘private financial gain’.8  The statutory backdrop is much the 
same in Australia, which also has a Free Trade Agreement with the US that was 
concluded in 2004.  Although section 132AC of the Australian Copyright Act 1968 is 
titled “commercial-scale infringement prejudicing copyright owner”, the express use of 
the phrase ‘commercial scale’ does not imply that the relevant provisions therein9 are 
only concerned with infringements that result in financial gain or commercial advantage 
to the accused. 10   Indeed, criminal prosecution can be brought in Australia against 
                                                 
7
 Title 17 of the United States Code. Section 506(a)(1) states: “Any person who willfully infringes a 
copyright shall be punished as provided under section 2319 of title 18, if the infringement was committed – 
(A) for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain; 
(B) by the reproduction or distribution, including by electronic means, during any 180-day period, 
of 1 or more copies or phonorecords of 1 or more copyrighted works, which have a total retail 
value of more than $1,000; or 
(C) by the distribution of a work being prepared for commercial distribution, by making it 
available on a computer network accessible to members of the public, if such person knew or 
should have known that the work was intended for commercial distribution.” 
8
 Section 506(a) of the US Copyright Act 1976 was amended in 1997 by the No Electronic Theft Act 
(Public Law No. 105-147, 111 Stat. 2678), which eliminated the requirement of ‘private financial gain’ or 
‘commercial advantage’ for the imposition of criminal liability. 
9
 Section 132AC(1) of the Australian Copyright Act 1968 states: “A person commits an [indictable] offence 
if – 
(a) the person engages in conduct; and 
(b) the conduct results in one or more infringements of the copyright in a work or other 
subject-matter; and 
(c) the infringement or infringements have a substantial prejudicial impact on the owner of the 
copyright; and 
(d) the infringement or infringements occur on a commercial scale.” 
Section 132AC(5) further elaborates: “In determining whether one or more infringements occur on a 
commercial scale for the purposes of [section 132AC(1)(d)] …, the following matters are to be taken into 
account: (a) the volume and value of any articles that are infringing copies that constitute the infringement 
or infringements; (b) any other relevant matter”. Clearly, the factors listed in section 132AC(5) mirror those 
found in section 136(6A) of the Singapore Copyright Act 1987 (as to which, see note 5, above). 
10
 See Article 17.11.26(a) of the Australia-US Free Trade Agreement which defines ‘wilful copyright 
piracy on a commercial scale’ as including “significant wilful infringements of copyright, that have no 
direct or indirect motivation of financial gain” – http://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/negotiations/us_fta/final-
text/chapter_17.html. 
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individuals who infringe copyright for private and non-commercial purposes but to such 
an extent that substantially prejudices the copyright owner.11 
 
Unlike the copyright statutes of the US, Australia and Singapore, the UK CDPA 
1988 presents quite a different picture.  The relevant criminal provision in the CDPA is 
section 107(2A),12 which is only concerned with one specific act of infringement – i.e. 
the breach of a copyright owner’s right to communicate a work to the public.13  What is 
noteworthy about this provision is that whereas the act of ‘uploading’ or ‘making 
available’ infringing files (to a ‘prejudicial’ extent) may attract criminal liability under 
the CDPA, the act of ‘downloading’ the same will not, even if the extent of which is 
‘significant’ or has a substantial prejudicial impact on the copyright owner. 
 
The Europeans, on the other hand, generally take a less robust view of the matter.  
Harmonisation efforts in the EU have led to the “Amended Proposal for a Directive of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on criminal measures aimed at ensuring the 
enforcement of intellectual property rights”.14  Sometimes referred to as the second IPR 
Enforcement Directive,15 it aims to harmonise, throughout the EU, the criminal measures 
necessary to ensure the enforcement of IPRs.  Article 3 of the Directive reads as follows: 
“Member States shall ensure that all intentional infringements of an intellectual property 
right on a commercial scale, and attempting, aiding or abetting and inciting such 
infringements, are treated as criminal offences”.  In a debate on the Amended Proposal 
and during its first reading on 25 April 2007,16 the European Parliament endorsed, inter 
alia, the following definition in Article 2:17 that infringements on a ‘commercial scale’ 
means “any infringement of an intellectual property right committed to obtain a 
commercial advantage; this excludes acts carried out by private users for personal and 
not-for-profit purposes”.  Notably, the European Parliament has adopted the view that 
infringements of IPRs by private individuals for “personal and not-for-profit purposes” 
(even where the extent of the infringement is significant and may cause direct economic 
harm to owners of IPRs) are to be expressly excluded from the ambit of the second IPR 
Enforcement Directive.  It is clear, from the European perspective, that such forms of 
infringement do not attract criminal liability. 
                                                 
11
 See ibid. 
12
 Section 107(2A) UK CDPA 1988 states: “A person who infringes copyright in a work by communicating 
the work to the public – 
(a) in the course of a business, or 
(b) otherwise than in the course of a business to such an extent as to affect prejudicially the owner 
of the copyright, 
commits an offence if he knows or has reason to believe that, by doing so, he is infringing copyright in that 
work.” 
13
 See section 20(2) UK CDPA 1988 for the definition of “communication to the public”. 
14
 Brussels, COM (2006) 168 final. 
15
 The first being “Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 
on the enforcement of intellectual property rights”. This IPR Enforcement Directive of 2004 only contains 
measures and procedures concerning civil sanctions and remedies. It was implemented in the UK in 
Regulations that came into force on 6 April 2006 – the Enforcement Regulations of 2006 (SI 2006/1027). 
16
 See http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/file.jsp?id=5263692. 
17
 See http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&language=EN&reference=P6-TA-2007-
0145 (emphasis added). 
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From the foregoing discussion, we see a polarity of views adopted by different 
jurisdictions worldwide on the very issue of criminalising primary acts of copyright 
infringement.  The prevailing mindset in Europe appears to be in stark contrast to that in 
the US and in those countries which have Free Trade Agreements with the US, such as 
Australia and Singapore.  Significantly, the Europeans have decided to maintain a clear 
distinction between infringements committed to obtain a commercial advantage (which 
may attract criminal liability) and all other forms of private and non-commercial 
infringement (which will not).  Be that as it may, it remains the objective of this paper to 
question the bases on which countries like the US, Australia and Singapore are able to 
justify the imposition of criminal liability on primary acts of copyright infringement in 
the digital environment which are private and non-commercial in nature.  This is a 
question to which our attention now turns. 
 
 
III. Justifications for Criminalising Primary Infringements of Copyright 
 
 
A. Introduction 
 
Why should tortious invasions of property (such as primary infringements of copyright) 
in the online environment be treated as criminal offences?  What are the possible 
justifications for applying the force of the criminal law to such forms of human behaviour?  
These are important overarching questions that will help guide us in our examination of 
the legitimacy of section 136(3A) of the Singapore Copyright Act 1987 (and like 
provisions elsewhere). 
 
According to conventional wisdom, the criminal law is a coercive and 
condemnatory tool employed by the State to control the behaviour of its people.  The 
ordering of a person’s conduct – to conform to the State’s view of how society should 
behave – certainly calls for proper justification, particularly when it is accompanied by 
punitive treatment for those who fail to comply as well as the social stigma that is 
associated with criminal liability.  In justifying criminalisation, commentators have 
suggested the following criteria:18 (i) the conduct in question must be wrongful (e.g. 
because it is immoral or causes harm or serious offence to others); (ii) it must be 
necessary to employ the criminal law to condemn or prevent such conduct (in the sense 
that the criminal law should only be employed as a “last resort”); and (iii) it must be 
permissible to criminalise the activity in light of the European Convention on Human 
Rights which was brought into force in the UK by the Human Rights Act 1998.19 
 
Indeed, the pro-criminalisation arguments must be even more compelling in the 
context of the present discussion, since the enforcement of intellectual property rights – 
                                                 
18
 CMV Clarkson, HM Keating and SR Cunningham, Clarkson and Keating Criminal Law: Text and 
Materials, 6th ed. (Thomson Sweet & Maxwell, 2007) at p 4. 
19
 A discussion of human rights jurisprudence (in particular, the impact of the UK Human Rights Act 1998) 
and its relevance to English criminal law is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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which are essentially personal property interests – is an issue that is already suitably 
addressed by the civil law.  Copyright owners can always avail themselves of civil 
remedies under the statute, some of which are quasi punitive in nature.  For example, 
under section 119(4) of the Singapore Copyright Act 1987 (or section 97(2) UK CDPA 
1988), ‘additional damages’ are available for infringements which are flagrant in 
nature.20  There is also the remedy of ‘statutory damages’ under sections 119(2)(d) and 
119(5) of the Singapore statute, a concept borrowed from the US Copyright Act 1976.  
Under the US statutory damages scheme, enhanced damages may be awarded in cases of 
‘wilful’ infringement to “punish” the infringer for his wilfulness. 21   Likewise, the 
flagrancy of the infringement is a relevant consideration in the court’s assessment of 
statutory damages in Singapore.  It is therefore not surprising to have commentators make 
such arguments:22 
 
“Civil law has a far greater involvement in offences of dishonesty than in violent 
or sexual offences; the very questions of property ownership and property rights 
are the subject of a complicated mass of rules relating to contracts, trusts, 
intellectual property, restitution, and so forth.  Many property losses could be 
tackled through the civil courts, by suing under one of these heads of civil law. … 
If the criminal law is to be reserved for significant challenges to the legal order, 
should there not be vigilance about the extension of the criminal sanction into 
spheres in which civil remedies exist, or where some non-criminal procedures 
might be more proportionate?” 
 
Yet, it is worth pointing out that the overall impact of civil remedies on copyright 
infringers differs significantly from the penal or censuring nature of criminal sanctions 
(in particular, the threat of imprisonment).  After all, the criminal law exists to impose 
punishment in situations where tortious remedies are an insufficient deterrent.  This 
message was recently underscored by the Singapore Court of Appeal in Leong Wai Kay v 
Carrefour Singapore Pte Ltd.23  The issue in this case was whether the appellant, who 
had already paid to the State the fine imposed on him under the criminal charge, 
remained liable to pay the respondent, as a civil debt, a like amount in respect of the 
                                                 
20
 Whilst an award of damages is traditionally understood to be compensatory (rather than exemplary or 
punitive) in nature, additional damages under section 97(2) of the CDPA 1988 have been held to include 
damages that will deprecate a defendant’s “couldn’t-care-less” attitude: Nottinghamshire Healthcare NHS 
Trust v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2002] RPC 49. In Australia (where similar provisions on additional 
damages are set out in section 115(4) of the Copyright Act 1968), case law has established that the courts 
are not limited to awarding compensatory damages, and that additional damages may be awarded on the 
basis of aggravated damages as well as exemplary/punitive damages: see, e.g., Autodesk Inc v Yee (1996) 
35 IPR 415; Raben Footwear Pty Ltd v Polygram Records Inc (1997) 37 IPR 417. See, further, M Wong, 
“Additional Damages for Copyright Infringement” (1998) 2 SJICL 117; C Michalos, “Copyright and 
Punishment: The Nature of Additional Damages” [2000] EIPR 470. 
21
 Section 504(c) of the US Copyright Act 1976 gives a court discretion to set statutory damages: (i) in a 
range between US$750 and US$30,000 per work “as the court considers just”, or (ii) as ‘enhanced’ 
damages of not more than US$150,000 per work in cases of ‘wilful’ infringement. For the full text of 
section 504(c), see: http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/504.html. 
22
 A Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law, 5th ed. (Oxford University Press, 2006) at pp 363-364 
(emphasis added). 
23
 [2007] 3 SLR 78. 
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bribes received by him.  In answering this question in the affirmative, Chan CJ reasoned 
that criminal proceedings under the statute were separate and distinct from civil 
proceedings which were based on an independent statutory cause of action.  The criminal 
process under the statute was, in his Honour’s view, intended to enhance the punishment 
against offenders and act as a general deterrence (against corruption in this case).  As 
such, the respondent’s right (in a civil action) to recover bribes from the appellant 
remained unaffected by the criminal conviction.  By parity of reasoning, it may be argued 
that the existence of criminal measures and the possibility of prosecution under the 
Copyright Act (e.g. section 136(3A)) are independent of the availability to the copyright 
owner of civil remedies under the statute.  Criminal proceedings – which may operate as 
an additional layer of deterrence and to enhance the punishment against (often 
recalcitrant) offenders – are separate and distinct from the civil remedial process for 
copyright infringement.24 
 
One other introductory point may be made.  The criminal law has long concerned 
itself with the protection of property interests, whether real or personal.  Because 
intellectual property is recognised and treated as a species of property, criminalising 
primary infringements of copyright may be legitimized on the same basis as offences 
concerning the violation of general property interests, such as the law of theft.  The 
extension of the criminal law from the corporeal to the incorporeal sphere may, from this 
perspective, not seem that unreasonable a stretch after all.  We will revisit this theme at 
several points in this paper. 
 
What, then, are the arguments which have been raised to justify the imposition of 
criminal liability on conduct that may be deemed “wrongful”?  Let us now examine some 
of these theories against the backdrop of primary infringements of copyright in the digital 
environment, and, in particular, in the private and non-commercial context. 
 
 
B. The Harm Principle 
 
Although legislative decision-making should rightfully respect and have regard to 
individual autonomy (or the personal rights of individuals), the State is nevertheless 
justified in restricting individual liberty where the conduct of the individual causes harm 
to others in society.  As John Stuart Mill so eminently put it:25 
 
                                                 
24
 As Professor Ashworth asserts: “The idea of a crime is that it is something that rightly concerns the State, 
and not just the person(s) affected by the wrongdoing. Many crimes are civil wrongs as well (torts or 
breaches of contract, for example), and it is for the injured party to decide whether or not to sue for 
damages. But the decision to make conduct into a crime implies that there is a public interest in ensuring 
that such conduct does not happen and that, when it does, there is the possibility of State punishment.” (A 
Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law, 5th ed. (Oxford University Press, 2006) at p 2) 
25
 JS Mill, On Liberty (1859) at pp 8-9. See also J Feinberg, Harm to Others (Oxford University Press, 
1984) at p 26: “It is always a good reason in support of penal legislation that it would be effective in 
preventing (eliminating, reducing) harm to persons other than the actor (the one prohibited from acting) and 
there is no other means that is equally effective at no greater cost to other values.” 
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“[T]he only purpose for which power can rightfully be exercised over any 
member of a civilised community against his will is to prevent harm to others. … 
To justify that, the conduct from which it is desired to deter him must be 
calculated to produce evil to someone else.” 
 
‘Harm’, in turn, has been defined by Joel Feinberg as a “thwarting, setting back or 
defeating of an interest”,26  and by Professor Ashworth as any violation of “people’s 
legitimate interests”, bearing in mind the “moral, cultural and political nature of the 
interests recognised in a particular system”.27  Characteristically, harm is brought about 
through the impairment of a person’s personal well-being or proprietary resources.  
However, insofar as online infringements of copyright are concerned, the “legitimate 
interests” involved here necessarily refer to the copyright owners’ rights in intangible 
property and the harm that results from such activities relates principally to economic or 
pecuniary harm.  To what extent, then, are private and non-commercial infringements of 
copyright in the online environment – such as uploading or ‘making available’ infringing 
files on a server and downloading such files to a computer28 – economically harmful to 
copyright owners as to warrant criminalisation? 
 
Take, for example, the recent blockbuster X-Men Origins: Wolverine, which was 
leaked onto the Internet several weeks before the movie hit the silver screen.  The 
Internet user who had uploaded an unauthorised copy of the film to a host server – even 
without any commercial motivation – would nevertheless have deprived the relevant 
copyright owners of the economic benefits of post-release sales transactions (e.g. box 
office takings, sales from the DVD release etc.).  Furthermore, such economic impact on 
copyright owners is particularly damaging in the online environment because of the 
relative ease and pace of infringement.29  In the Wolverine example, it was reported in the 
media that more than 150,000 copies of the movie were downloaded by Netizens 
worldwide from one file-sharing website alone. 30   Likewise, insofar as Internet 
downloaders are concerned, they have obtained for themselves an illegitimate copy of the 
copyright work without having paid for it.  A serial downloader with tens of thousands of 
infringing files stored in his computer has caused significant harm to numerous copyright 
owners.  Even though each downloaded work enjoys its own separate and distinct 
copyright (a point to which we will return below), it is likely the case that many of the 
works in the infringer’s collection share the same copyright owner(s) – whether it be the 
same composer, lyricist, script writer, performing artist, or (and much more likely) the 
                                                 
26
 J Feinberg, Harm to Others (Oxford University Press, 1984) at p 33. 
27
 A Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law, 5th ed. (Oxford University Press, 2006) at p 30. 
28
 Uploading and downloading infringing files are acts which constitute a breach of the exclusive rights of 
the copyright owner – see, generally, the discussion in CL Saw and S Leong, “Criminalising Primary 
Copyright Infringement in Singapore: Who are the Real Online Culprits?” [2007] EIPR 108. 
29
 From the speech by Singapore’s Minister for Law at the second reading of the Copyright (Amendment) 
Bill on 16 November 2004: “With the advent of digital technology, the impact of infringement on the 
interests of copyright owners has, as a result, become very much more severe. For example, Internet 
technology now makes it possible for syndicates to post movies and software for all to download for free, 
sometimes in return for nothing more than recognition and notoriety. While these infringers may not 
directly profit from these activities, their actions may cause substantial harm to the copyright owner, his 
investments and creative efforts.” (Hansard, vol. 78 col. 1041) 
30
 See The Straits Times, 4 April 2009 at p B2. 
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same sound recording company (e.g. Sony Music Entertainment) or Hollywood movie 
studio (e.g. 20th Century Fox).  Considering the scale of the infringing activity per 
Internet user alone clearly illustrates the magnitude of the problem.31 
 
Such is the gravity of the harm that may ensue at the level of the “individual” 
copyright owner.  Harm may also have a profound effect at a deeper, “institutional” level.  
For example, it may be argued that copyright infringement is not simply a matter of a 
breach of “private” rights.  Uncontrolled online piracy hurts not just the private economic 
interests of the copyright owner; it has an impact on society as a whole.  If the scale of 
online copyright infringement is left unchecked and unregulated, this will ultimately lead 
to the undermining and the eventual collapse of the IP regime, a proprietary institution 
that was developed to reward (largely in monetary terms) intellectual effort and creativity.  
The collective impact of online infringements on a ‘significant’ scale (the notion of 
‘cumulative’ harm) may result in authors and entrepreneurs losing the incentive to create 
new works for the future.  To draw an analogy with the law of theft and the stealing of 
one’s property:32 
 
“Stealing my old clothes not only sets back the interest, if any, that I have in the 
clothes; it also undermines the regime by which my property right in the clothes is 
recognized. That is to say, more than one type of interest is at stake when my 
clothes are stolen.  Apart from my immediate interest in the clothes, both I and 
others have an interest in the existence of a system for allocating and reallocating 
property rights in general.  Thus, even where a theft does not set back V’s 
personal interests, it sets back the interest we all have in the effective existence of 
a property law regime.  The regime itself serves our well-being by providing a 
reliable means by which we can seek to improve our own lives through the 
voluntary acquisition, use, and exchange of resources.  Having such a regime 
augments our autonomy …” 
 
                                                 
31
 The US copyright industry, for example, estimates its losses due to piracy at about US$20 billion a year. 
According to a Washington Post report, a study by the International Federation of the Phonographic 
Industry (IFPI) revealed that approximately 95% of music downloaded in 2008 (or more than 40 billion 
files) was illegal and not paid for. The picture painted here is a familiar one – that the scale of infringement 
continues to eat into traditional revenues of the recording industry (the IFPI report also asserts that 
worldwide music revenue shrank by about 7% in 2008). See: 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/01/16/AR2009011603077.html. Turning to 
software piracy, the Business Software Alliance (BSA) recently reported, through a study conducted by 
research agency IDC, that worldwide piracy rates rose from 38% in 2007 to 41% in 2008, with losses to 
companies estimated at US$53 billion. See: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/05/12/AR2009051200095.html. Interestingly, the BSA report noted that personal 
computer software piracy in Singapore actually dropped one percentage point to 36% in 2008, although 
dollar losses continued to increase (rising to US$163 million from about US$159 million in 2007). For the 
situation in the UK where a report by the Strategic Advisory Board for Intellectual Property revealed that 
about 7 million people there were involved in illegal downloading, see: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/8073068.stm. 
32
 AP Simester and A von Hirsch, “Rethinking the Offence Principle” (2002) 8 Legal Theory 269 at 286 
(emphasis added). 
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It is therefore submitted that just by invoking the harm principle itself justifies the 
criminalisation of such forms of human behaviour, and that it is clearly inadequate to 
leave such conduct redressable only by (civil) compensation of the aggrieved party. 
 
Notwithstanding these pro-criminalisation arguments, we proceed to examine if 
there had been a proper application of the harm principle in Parliament’s enactment of 
section 136(3A).  In this regard, Joel Feinberg has helpfully suggested that the following 
matters be considered when criminalising conduct on the basis of the harm principle: the 
gravity of the possible harm, its degree of probability/likelihood, the magnitude of the 
risk of harm, and the social value of the conduct to be prohibited.33  It may be usefully 
noted that these guidelines have been duly incorporated in section 136(6A), where, in 
determining whether the extent of the infringement is ‘significant’, the court may have 
regard to such matters as “the volume of any articles that are infringing copies”, as well 
as “whether the infringement has a substantial prejudicial impact on the owner of the 
copyright”.  Obviously, the greater the gravity and magnitude of the harm, the stronger 
the case is for criminal prosecution under section 136(3A). 
 
 
C. Morally Wrong Behaviour 
 
Another view which has been articulated in support of criminalisation concerns conduct 
that is “inherently immoral, even though it causes neither harm nor offence to the actor or 
to others”.34  Having argued that the downloading and file-sharing activities of online 
infringers do result in harmful consequences for copyright owners, the point may further 
be made that such forms of conduct also constitute, in and of themselves, morally wrong 
or unethical behaviour. 
 
Morality, when used in this context, refers to an ethical system of rules that 
specifies the parameters of acceptable behaviour.  More specifically, we are here 
concerned with the notion of ‘public’ morality, 35  where the standards of morally 
acceptable conduct are to be judged by reasonable and right-minded members of society.  
In other words, immoral conduct “is something that offends against the community 
spirit”.36  Herein lies the difficulty in assessing the morality of online infringing conduct 
– this is an issue that will attract highly polarized views from the Internet community.37  
Notwithstanding this, the present author will explain, from first principles, why inherent 
moral turpitude can be attributed to such forms of behaviour and why the “community 
spirit” should begin to reflect this perspective. 
                                                 
33
 See J Feinberg, Harm to Others (Oxford University Press, 1984) at pp 215-216. 
34
 Ibid. at p 27. See also D Husak, The Philosophy of Criminal Law (Rowman & Littlefield, 1987), chapter 
8; M Moore, Placing Blame (Clarendon Press, 1997), chapter 16. 
35
 See, generally, P Devlin, The Enforcement of Morals (Oxford University Press, 1965). Cf. ‘private’ 
morality (or morality issues that arise in the “private lives” of individuals) which was the subject of 
controversy in the 1957 Report of the Wolfenden Committee on Homosexual Offences and Prostitution. 
36
 CMV Clarkson, HM Keating and SR Cunningham, Clarkson and Keating Criminal Law: Text and 
Materials, 6th ed. (Thomson Sweet & Maxwell, 2007) at p 5. 
37
 See: http://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/music/news/its-not-a-crime-to-download-say-
musicians-1643217.html. 
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The morality-based arguments (or arguments based on justice and fairness) used 
to justify the criminalisation of online infringing activity are largely premised on a 
fundamental tenet in copyright law – that copyright is expressly recognised by statute as a 
form of personal property.38  In other words, copyright protection comes with the status 
of property.39  The relationship between the owner and his property was characterised by 
a notable Scottish philosopher in these terms: 
 
“A man’s property is something related to him: This relation is not natural, but 
moral and founded upon justice. … The origin of justice explains that of 
property”.40 
 
Indeed, commentators often call upon moral and ethical justifications for conferring 
property rights on intangible assets.  Copyright, for example, is justified on the basis that 
the law recognises an author’s ‘natural rights’ over the products of his intellectual labour 
and investment.41  The civil law droit d’auteur system in fact places especial emphasis on 
moral rights and the natural rights of authors in their creations.42  Essentially, there are 
two perspectives of the natural rights theory – one based on George Hegel’s ‘personality’ 
justification, 43  and the other on John Locke’s ‘labour’ justification. 44   As Professor 
Hughes notes: “Properly elaborated, the labour and personality theories together exhaust 
the set of morally acceptable justifications of intellectual property”.45 
 
Consider then the habit of illegal downloading against this backdrop.  In such 
cases, the Internet user (copyright infringer named X) would have obtained an 
illegitimate copy of the song/movie (over which property rights subsist) without having 
paid for it.  It may well be that X has not deprived – not even temporarily – the copyright 
                                                 
38
 In Singapore, the proprietary nature of copyright (as ‘personal or movable property’) is recognised in 
section 194(1) of the Copyright Act 1987. 
39
 For a historical analysis from the US perspective, see J Hughes, “Copyright and Incomplete 
Historiographies: Of Piracy, Propertization, and Thomas Jefferson” (2005-2006) 79(5) Southern California 
Law Review 993. Professor Hughes notes thus (at p 1041): “… we must recognize that people have called 
copyright “property” for the past two hundred years”. 
40
 D Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, LA Selby-Bigge and PH Nidditch (eds.), 2nd ed. (Clarendon Press, 
1978) at p 491 (emphasis added). 
41
 So fundamental are these ‘natural rights’ that they have earned a place in Article 27(2) of the UN 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights: “Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material 
interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author”. See also 
Article 1 of Protocol One of the European Convention on Human Rights: “Every natural or legal person is 
entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions”. 
42
 See, e.g., the French Intellectual Property Code 1992. The common law (utilitarian) model of copyright 
is, in contrast, primarily concerned with an author’s economic rights – see WM Landes and RA Posner, 
“An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law” (1989) 18 J. Legal Stud. 325. 
43
 See G Hegel, Philosophy of Right (1821), trans. TM Knox (Clarendon Press, 1952). For a detailed 
discussion of Hegel’s ‘personality’ theory of property, see J Hughes, “The Philosophy of Intellectual 
Property” (1988) 77 Georgetown L.J. 287 (at p 330 et seq). 
44
 See J Locke, Second Treatise of Government (1694) in Two Treatises of Government, P Laslett (ed.) 
(Cambridge University Press, 1988). For a detailed discussion of Locke’s ‘labour’ theory of property, see J 
Hughes, “The Philosophy of Intellectual Property” (1988) 77 Georgetown L.J. 287 (at p 296 et seq). 
45
 J Hughes, “The Philosophy of Intellectual Property” (1988) 77 Georgetown L.J. 287 at 290. 
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owner of possession of the work (nor prevented the latter from exercising his rights to the 
intangible property), unlike an instance of theft in the traditional sense (a point to which 
we will return below).  However, the fact remains that X has not furnished the requisite 
quid pro quo – he has simply taken or obtained a piece of property (and later enjoying the 
benefits of acquisition) for nothing, not unlike a thief who steals a CD from a retail shop 
and later listens to it with pleasure.  In restitutionary parlance, X has been “unjustly 
enriched” by his own behaviour at the expense of the copyright owner.  Is it not morally 
or ethically unacceptable for X to reap, from the unauthorised use of copyright material, 
an unearned benefit?  Is it not common knowledge that it is morally wrong and a crime to 
steal from someone else, even if for private and non-commercial purposes and whether 
the object stolen is a diamond ring or a pack of sweets? 
 
The moral high ground taken above in respect of copyright finds further support 
from the religious perspective.  One online commentator, in interpreting the 8th 
Commandment “Thou shall not steal” (Exodus 20:15), expressed the following view:46 
 
“People today regard [the 8th Commandment] as a prohibition against any theft of 
any sort of real property.  Does it, however, also include theft of non-real property, 
like intellectual or creative properties?  Does this commandment even allow for 
the possibility of someone ‘owning’ a creative work and having copyrights over it?  
Most religious scholars today probably agree that it does, though in doing so they 
are accepting modern understandings of the nature of property.  There were no 
copyrights or patents among the ancient Hebrews and such oral cultures probably 
wouldn’t have understood the concepts.” 
 
The 2nd of the ‘Five Precepts’ – which constitute the basic Buddhist code of ethics – 
teaches all Buddhists to “abstain from taking what is not given”, i.e. to abstain from 
stealing.  Clearly, these religious teachings constantly remind us that taking something 
that belongs to someone else, without permission, is morally wrong. 
 
It is high time that the Internet community understands and appreciates the moral 
dimension in copyright protection.47  More importantly, online users must begin to equate 
                                                 
46
 See http://atheism.about.com/od/tencommandments/a/commandment08.htm and cf. Laddie J’s remarks 
in Autospin (Oil Seals) Ltd v Beehive Spinning [1995] RPC 683 at 700. Another online commentary from 
this website (http://dir.salon.com/story/tech/feature/2004/05/25/christian_pirates/) filed the following report 
(emphasis added): 
“The Gospel Music Association … has responded to its flock’s cavalier attitude about file trading 
with a new public-service campaign, hoping to appeal to a churchgoer’s sense of right and wrong. 
The slogan: ‘Music Piracy: Millions of Wrongs Don’t Make It Right’. The campaign will 
complement the most recent wave of lawsuits, targeting 477 alleged illegal file sharers, unleashed 
by the Recording Industry Association of America. But Styll [president of the Association] thinks 
that his group can spread a message about file sharing that even the harsh stick of lawsuits cannot: 
‘It’s more than just illegal. It’s immoral. It’s breaking the laws of the land, and it’s stealing from 
people, and you shouldn’t do it,’ he says.” 
47
 See W Cornish and D Llewelyn, Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyright, Trade Marks and Allied 
Rights, 6th ed. (Thomson Sweet & Maxwell, 2007) at pp 403-404 (emphasis added): 
“The uncalculating exchange of ideas has long been part of scholarship and of shared interests of 
many kinds. If new technology enables that process to evolve, so much the better. But to suppose 
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the moral imperative against stealing with the illicit uploading and downloading of 
copyright material.  To the extent that online infringements of copyright constitute moral 
wrongs, it is submitted that criminalising such behaviour on this basis is eminently 
justified. 
 
 
D. Deterrence and Retribution 
 
“[I]f the punishment of people in D’s position would have an overall deterrent effect, 
then D should be punished”. 48   This is the utilitarian theory of punishment, the 
justification for which is the principle of deterrence or the prevention of future crime 
(what utilitarians call a ‘net social gain’).  By criminalising and punishing online 
infringing conduct, the ‘net social gain’ to be achieved is the prevention of future harm 
that may be caused by the infringer himself (as a repeat offender) or by other Internet 
users.49  Criminalisation/punishment from the utilitarian perspective is therefore aimed at 
enhancing the social welfare of the community.  On this basis, one may argue that the 
enactment of section 136(3A) – and its regulatory effects on online behaviour – may have 
been necessary for the collective good of society.  Having the criminal provision in force, 
it is submitted, sends a strong signal from the Legislature that the State does not condone 
such forms of activity and serves as a tangible layer of deterrence to potential infringers 
of copyright who easily fall into temptation whenever the opportunity to upload or 
download arises. 
 
Section 136(3A) may also be explained by the retributive theory.  Retributivism, 
which is non-utilitarian in character, asserts that criminalisation and punishment are 
properly justified because, and only because, the offender deserves it.  This theory, which 
may be used to express disapproval and censure of the offender’s conduct, is particularly 
relevant in cases involving recalcitrant offenders – e.g. those who engage in illegal 
downloading with full knowledge of its legality but who nevertheless keep at it.  In 
examining the past conduct of the online infringer, the retributive view asserts that 
punishment is necessary because this offender clearly deserves it and must be taken to 
task for his behaviour.  Herein lies the intrinsic value of punishment that is deserved – the 
offender must receive his ‘just deserts’ and society has a duty to punish for this reason 
alone. 
 
 
E. Summary 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
that it will supplant the need for informational, educational and entertainment material which is 
generated upon the expectation of a market return is the stuff of dreams. Copyright will remain 
because it provides necessary protection for the investment of intellectual effort and capital in 
material which is not produced in order to be freely shared. The law may have to be somewhat 
adapted, but its moral mainspring – that works should not be substantially copied or otherwise 
taken without authority – expresses a justification for legal intervention which will remain very 
widely accepted.” 
48
 A Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law, 5th ed. (Oxford University Press, 2006) at p 159. 
49
 As to the nature of harm, see the discussion above under ‘The Harm Principle’. 
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Thus far, this paper has sought to examine the legitimacy of section 136(3A) of the 
Singapore Copyright Act 1987, a provision which, inter alia, criminalises primary acts of 
copyright infringement on a significant scale, even if the infringements were committed 
for private and non-commercial purposes.  The foregoing analysis has shown that 
imposing criminal sanctions pursuant to section 136(3A) is eminently justifiable on the 
basis of the harm principle as well as on grounds of morality.  Secondarily, the principle 
of deterrence and the retributive theory may also be raised as possible justifications for 
deploying the criminal law under such circumstances. 
 
Critics may claim that section 136(3A) was conceived largely because of the 
politics of lawmaking – as a pragmatic Government response to political pressure from 
US FTA negotiators (due, of course, to the ferocious lobbying efforts of the various 
copyright industries in the US).50  Be that as it may and for reasons which will be given 
later, this author is personally in support of such a provision and of the penal approach in 
general, particularly when viewed as part of a broader, multi-pronged strategy to combat 
online piracy. 
 
 
IV. Drawing Parallels with the Law of Theft – is copyright infringement analogous 
to stealing? 
 
As is well known, the offence of theft has traditionally been classified as a property 
offence in the criminal law.  There has also been, in recent times, a wave of expansion in 
the scope of the offence with the recognition of new forms of property (in particular, 
intangible property).  Owing to the proprietary nature of copyright (as discussed above), 
there is a natural tendency to associate all infringements of copyright with the act of 
stealing.51  To what extent, though, is this analogy appropriate? 
 
Equating copyright infringement with theft is somewhat problematic from a 
technical (statutory) perspective.  In the Singapore context, it is indefensible for a 
copyright infringer to be charged with theft under section 378 of the Penal Code.52  There 
are two principal reasons why this is so, apart from the fact that the drafters of the Code 
had obviously not contemplated such a scenario at the time.  Firstly, the offence of theft 
in Singapore is concerned with the dishonest movement of ‘movable property’.  Section 
22 of the Code defines ‘movable property’ as ‘corporeal property’, which refers to forms 
of property that have a physical or material being (e.g. chattels or choses in possession).  
It is doubtful if copyright – an intangible property right – can fit this definition.  
                                                 
50
 See A Ashworth, “Is the Criminal Law a Lost Cause?” (2000) 116 LQR 225. 
51
 Per Jowitt J in R v Carter [1993] FSR 303 at 304: “… counterfeiting of video films is a serious offence. 
In effect to make and distribute pirate copies of films is to steal from the true owner of the copyright, the 
property for which he has to expend money in order to possess it. It is an offence really of dishonesty”. Cf. 
also these parliamentary remarks by Lord Beaverbrook: “Whether one calls it piracy, bootlegging or 
counterfeiting, what we are really talking about is the misappropriation of someone else’s property. That 
can only be regarded as theft.” (Hansard, HL Deb., vol. 491 col. 422) 
52
 Cap. 224 (2008 Rev. Ed.). Section 378 states: “Whoever, intending to take dishonestly any movable 
property out of the possession of any person without that person’s consent, moves that property in order to 
such taking, is said to commit theft”. 
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Copyright per se, as we shall see later, is not readily protected by the law of theft.  
Secondly, theft is treated in the Penal Code as an offence against rights of ‘possession’.  
Even if an Internet user has downloaded an unauthorised MP3 file, the copyright owner is 
not thereby dispossessed of the original MP3 file, not even temporarily.  An infringement 
of copyright can occur without exhaustion of the “physical” property itself.  In such a 
scenario, there is simply the creation of an additional (albeit illegal) copy of the copyright 
work. 
 
Likewise, several impediments stand in the way of prosecuting a copyright 
infringer under section 1 of the English Theft Act 1968.53  We begin with the mens rea 
requirement that the accused had the ‘intention’ to ‘permanently deprive’ the owner of 
his property.  As was alluded to in the preceding paragraph, there is no deprivation of 
property when the accused downloads (or even uploads) an infringing file – the copyright 
owner will not be deprived (not even temporarily, let alone permanently) of his 
copyright. 54   It is also inconceivable that the accused did harbour the intention to 
permanently deprive the owner of his property, since all that the infringer wants for 
himself is a copy of the original work.55  Perhaps it is because the accused knows that the 
copyright owner is not, in any way, deprived of (nor prevented from exercising his rights 
to) his property that the accused believes he has not committed theft.  More 
controversially, do intangible property rights fit the definition of ‘property’ under the 
Theft Act 1968?  ‘Property’ is defined in section 4(1) to include “money and all other 
property, real or personal, including things in action and other intangible property”.  On 
one view, it may be argued that the expansive definition of ‘property’ in section 4(1) 
contemplates ‘things in action’, and copyright is by nature a chose in action.  The 
definition also includes ‘other intangible property’, an example of which is copyright.  
The better view, however, is that copyright (and indeed IPRs in general) should not be 
regarded as ‘property’ for the purposes of the law of theft.  This is certainly the case 
insofar as confidential information is concerned.56  It is probably fair to assert that it was 
beyond Parliament’s intention for the offence of theft to extend so far into the realm of 
                                                 
53
 Section 1(1) of the Theft Act 1968 states: “A person is guilty of theft if he dishonestly appropriates 
property belonging to another with the intention of permanently depriving the other of it”. 
54
 Cf. AP Simester and GR Sullivan, Criminal Law: Theory and Doctrine, Revised 2nd ed. (Hart Publishing, 
2004) at p 427: “Even where the right being interfered with is property for the purposes of the [Theft] Act, 
the interference may not always count as theft. Breach of copyright, for instance, violates a chose in action. 
But photocopying a textbook does not deprive the copyright owner of the book. Neither does it deprive her 
of copyright in that book”. See also W Cornish and D Llewelyn, Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyright, 
Trade Marks and Allied Rights, 6th ed. (Thomson Sweet & Maxwell, 2007) at p 37: “If A appropriates B’s 
invention, both remain able to use it. A does not preclude B from competing in the same measure as when 
he has appropriated the axe which B previously used for tree-cutting”. 
55
 See A Steel, “Problematic and Unnecessary? Issues with the Use of the Theft Offence to Protect 
Intangible Property” (2008) 30 Sydney Law Review 575 at 603: “… it is unsatisfactory that theft is defined 
[e.g. in the Theft Act 1968] in such a way that breaches of copyright can amount to all of the actus reus 
elements of theft, and liability is only avoided on the technical ground that the nature of the property right 
means that the intention of the accused cannot be defined as an intent of permanent deprivation”. 
56
 See Boardman v Phipps [1967] 2 AC 46; Oxford v Moss (1978) 68 Cr App R 183 (where it was held that 
confidential information contained in examination questions was not ‘intangible property’ within the 
meaning of section 4 of the Theft Act 1968); RG Hammond, “Theft of Information” (1984) 100 LQR 252; 
A Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law, 5th ed. (Oxford University Press, 2006) at p 372. 
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intangible property.57  Otherwise, “an artificial extension of the present structure of the 
law of theft to cover such cases, which lie far from the ordinary stealing of tangible 
property, would probably be less successful and might have unexpected side-effects”.58  
It appears that the English judiciary is also in agreement with this view.  In the 
unanimous decision of the House of Lords in Rank Film Distributors Ltd v Video 
Information Centre,59 Lord Wilberforce (who delivered the main speech) expressed the 
view that “[i]nfringement of copyright is not theft” within the ambit of the Theft Act 
1968.60 
 
Notwithstanding these arguments which arise from a highly technical 
interpretation of the law, it is this author’s thesis that drawing parallels with the law of 
theft – at least from the conceptual/moral dimension – is nevertheless worthwhile in the 
attempt to justify the criminalisation of non-commercial infringements of copyright on a 
‘significant’ scale.  It is axiomatic that one of the functions or purposes of the criminal 
law is to protect rights in property.  Since copyright is an intangible personal property 
right that is enforceable as a chose in action, the criminal law should – akin to the manner 
in which the offence of theft protects tangible personal property – be invoked to protect 
against breaches of copyright in appropriate circumstances. 
 
It has already been highlighted above that stealing, regardless of motive, is 
morally or ethically wrong. 61   Stealing for private and non-commercial purposes is 
certainly not a defence to a charge of theft – the law punishes the thief nonetheless.  
Arguably, the illicit downloading of copyright works, regardless of motive, is also (like 
stealing) morally wrong and deserving of criminal sanction.62  The only “concession” 
given to illegal downloaders in this regard (which is absent in the law of theft) is that 
criminal liability will only attach if the extent of the infringement is ‘significant’ (which 
reflects the application of the ‘harm principle’).  This author is therefore of the view that 
there is a powerful conceptual/moral nexus between copyright infringement and theft.  
However, because it is not technically orthodox to charge a copyright infringer with theft, 
criminal provisions (like section 136(3A)) have been progressively introduced – sui 
generis – to protect copyright owners, and justifiably so for all the reasons given above. 
                                                 
57
 Indeed, copyright infringement was not an issue at all considered by the Criminal Law Revision 
Committee in its Eighth Report: Theft and Related Offences (Cmnd. 2977, 1966). 
58
 A Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law, 5th ed. (Oxford University Press, 2006) at p 373. See also A 
Steel, “Problematic and Unnecessary? Issues with the Use of the Theft Offence to Protect Intangible 
Property” (2008) 30 Sydney Law Review 575 (especially at pp 603 and 613). 
59
 [1982] AC 380. 
60
 Ibid., at p 443. Lord Fraser expressed a similar view: “The risk of prosecution under the Theft Act may, I 
think, be disregarded as remote, because that Act applies to theft of ‘property’ which is defined in a way 
that does not appear to include copyright, but only, so far as this appeal is concerned, to the physical 
objects such as tapes and cassettes which are of small value by themselves” (ibid., at p 445; emphasis 
added). See also the US decision of Blackmun J in Dowling v United States 473 US 207 (1985) at p 217: 
“interference with copyright does not easily equate with theft, conversion or fraud”. 
61
 See the discussion above under ‘Morally Wrong Behaviour’. 
62
 See para 18 in Chapter 4 of the final Digital Britain report: “The Government considers online piracy to 
be a serious offence. Unlawful downloading or uploading, whether via peer-to-peer sites or other means, is 
effectively a civil form of theft”. The report is available at: 
http://www.culture.gov.uk/images/publications/chpt4_digitalbritain-finalreport-jun09.pdf. 
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V. Section 136(3A): Interpretational Difficulties and Suggestions for Reform 
 
Having assessed and accepted the legitimacy of section 136(3A), the paper proceeds to 
examine the potential reach of this provision.  How wide should the net of criminality be 
cast in the battle against online copyright infringement?  In answering this question, two 
difficulties with interpreting section 136(3A) are encountered. 
 
The first concerns the meaning of the word ‘significant’.  Section 136(6A) states 
that in determining whether the extent of the infringement is ‘significant’ (for the 
purposes of section 136(3A)), the court may have regard to “the volume of any articles 
that are infringing copies” (and note that it is not “the volume of infringing copies” per 
se).  It has been argued elsewhere that the use of the word ‘articles’ is particularly 
problematic in the context of online infringements of copyright.63  For example, whilst it 
may be argued that an Internet user who has downloaded 100,000 infringing MP3 files is 
in possession of a large volume of infringing copies, it is questionable if he is actually in 
possession of a large volume of articles that are infringing copies.  It is plausible, on one 
view, that there is only one article in this instance – namely, the computer hard drive in 
which all the infringing copies are stored.  The controversial issue is whether a computer 
file or an electronic copy can constitute an ‘article’.  On a plain reading of the provision, 
this seems unlikely as the word ‘article’ suggests a medium that is tangible or physical in 
nature.64  One possible solution to this problem would be to delete the word ‘articles’ 
from section 136(6A), although this may result in some linguistic inconsistency between 
section 136(3A) (when read with section 136(6A)) and the other criminal provisions in 
section 136 which generally prohibit secondary acts of copyright infringement.  The 
alternative, which seems preferable, is for Singapore’s legislators to follow in the 
footsteps of their Australian counterparts in providing a definition for the word ‘articles’ 
on similar terms.65 
 
Even if this linguistic ambiguity is subsequently clarified, it must be borne in 
mind that one of the intended purposes of section 136(3A) is to help contain the 
proliferation of online copyright piracy.  The target offender, particularly when the ‘harm 
principle’ is taken into consideration, must be someone who is truly guilty of copyright 
infringement on a ‘significant’ scale.  The illegal downloader in my example above may 
be said to have caused significant economic harm to the copyright industry as a whole (in 
light of the sheer volume of infringing copies), but is the harm so caused by him suffered 
by one and the same copyright owner?  It is undeniable that he is in actual possession of a 
large number of infringing files, but it must be remembered that each downloaded work 
enjoys its own separate copyright and has its own distinct set of copyright owners.  
                                                 
63
 See CL Saw and S Leong, “Criminalising Primary Copyright Infringement in Singapore: Who are the 
Real Online Culprits?” [2007] EIPR 108 at 112-113. 
64
 See also G Wei, The Law of Copyright in Singapore, 2nd ed. (SNP Editions, 2000) at p 1284. 
65
 Section 132AA of the Australian Copyright Act 1968 states that the word ‘article’ includes “a 
reproduction or copy of a work or other subject-matter, being a reproduction or copy in electronic form” 
(emphasis added). 
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Therefore, whilst the scale of the infringing activity in the aggregate is a good indication 
of ‘harm’, what is crucially important is that the harm so caused by the infringer must 
correlate with the harm that is correspondingly suffered by the individual copyright 
owner.  Only when the evidence reveals that the individual copyright owner (e.g. a 
particular sound recording company), amongst others in the infringer’s collection of 
100,000 unauthorised files, has suffered ‘significant’ harm should a charge under section 
136(3A) be brought against the offender – someone who is likely to be a serial, 
compulsive and incorrigible downloader.66 
 
The second difficulty concerns the mens rea element (or lack thereof) of the 
offence in section 136(3A), which states that the infringement committed by the accused 
must be ‘wilful’.67  There is, unfortunately, no statutory definition for the word ‘wilful’.  
Apart from this uncertainty, another pertinent issue is whether the offence in section 
136(3A) ought to be construed as a strict liability offence, where an accused may be 
convicted upon proof of the physical elements (actus reus) of the crime alone.  It would 
appear rather odd, as a preliminary observation, for section 136(3A) to be treated as a 
strict liability offence when the other offences contained in section 136 – dealing 
generally with (more culpable) acts of secondary copyright infringement – do not impose 
conditions of strict liability.68 
 
                                                 
66
 See, further, the discussion in CL Saw and S Leong, “Defining Criminal Liability for Primary Acts of 
Copyright Infringement: The Singapore Experience” [2008] JBL 304 at 310-313. 
67
 The concept of ‘wilfulness’ is also found in section 506(a)(1) of the US Copyright Act 1976, which 
begins with these words: “Any person who willfully infringes a copyright …”. There is likewise no 
statutory definition for the word ‘willfully’, although section 506(a)(2) states that “evidence of 
reproduction or distribution of a copyrighted work, by itself, shall not be sufficient to establish willful 
infringement of a copyright”. It is not immediately apparent what further evidence as regards mens rea is 
required (beyond the mere fact of reproduction or distribution, as the case may be) to establish ‘willful’ 
infringements of copyright under US law. On one view, the statutory language employed in section 
506(a)(2) suggests that the offence prescribed in section 506(a)(1) is not strict liability. One commentator 
has argued that the word ‘willful’ in this provision requires the prosecution to prove that the accused 
intentionally violated a known legal duty and that the accused lacked a good faith belief that the conduct at 
issue was lawful, a view which clearly rejects the notion of strict liability (see LP Loren, “Digitization, 
Commodification, Criminalization: The Evolution of Criminal Copyright Infringement and the Importance 
of the Willfulness Requirement” (1999) 77 Washington University Law Quarterly 835 at 888). See also 
United States v Rose 149 USPQ 820 (SDNY 1966) (an act is done ‘willfully’ if done voluntarily and 
purposefully and with specific intent to do what the law forbids) and United States v Cross 816 F2d 297, 
303 (7th Cir. 1987) (the defendant must be shown to have engaged in the infringing conduct with knowledge 
that his/her activity was prohibited by law). For comparative purposes, reference may also be made to 
Article 3 of the EU’s second IPR Enforcement Directive (see above) which criminalises ‘intentional’ 
infringements of IPRs on a commercial scale, and the word ‘intentional’ means – according to the 
definition in Article 2 that was adopted by the European Parliament during the first reading of the Directive 
on 25 April 2007 – “deliberate and conscious”. 
68
 For example, in sections 136(1), (2), (3) and (6) of the Singapore Copyright Act 1987, the requisite 
mental element for establishing secondary copyright liability is that the accused “knows, or ought 
reasonably to know” that the articles he is dealing with are infringing copies of the work. Cf. also sections 
107(1), (2) and (3) UK CDPA 1988 (“knows or has reason to believe”). 
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‘Wilful’, in ordinary parlance, refers to an act done “deliberately”, “consciously” 
or “intentionally”.69  This could mean either that (1) the conduct was done voluntarily in 
the sense that it was an act of free will (of one’s own accord/volition), or (2) the conduct 
was done with a consciousness of the evil which was likely to result (e.g. there was an 
intention to produce that evil).70  On a plain reading of section 136(3A), it is submitted 
that interpretation (1) is the more likely.  The deliberate/conscious/intended nature of the 
conduct of the accused (X) extends only to the physical elements of the offence in 
question – e.g. that X had the basic intent/aim/objective to download infringing files, and 
not that X had further intended to commit (in the sense that X knew or ought to have 
known that he was committing) an infringement of copyright in the course of 
downloading infringing files.71  Wilfulness, in the context of section 136(3A), is only 
concerned with the doing of the physical act itself for the purpose of achieving a desired 
result. 
 
Such a construction of the word ‘wilful’ naturally leads to the proposition that 
section 136(3A) prescribes an offence of strict liability.72  What this entails is that the 
prosecution need only prove, for a charge under section 136(3A), that the conduct of the 
offender (the infringement committed by X) was voluntarily and deliberately performed.  
There is no need for proof that X, in downloading infringing files, also knew (or ought 
reasonably to have known) that his actions amounted to an infringement of copyright.  
The offender’s lack of knowledge of the wrongfulness of his conduct (i.e. lack of mens 
rea) is irrelevant in offences of strict liability.  X may be liable to conviction solely on the 
basis that he did, in fact, commit the acts of infringement deliberately, regardless of 
whether he was morally culpable or blameworthy. 
 
The notion that criminal liability under section 136(3A) is strict is, of course, 
consistent with the position at civil law.  Civil liability for primary infringements of 
                                                 
69
 For an analysis of the possible interpretations of the word ‘wilful’ in both the civil and criminal law, see 
JA Andrews, “Wilfulness: a Lesson in Ambiguity” (1981) 1 Legal Studies 303. Professor Andrews notes 
(at p 323) that insofar as the criminal law is concerned, the word ‘wilfully’ has “continued to be widely 
interpreted to mean anything which is not accidental, when one would expect this to be precisely the area of 
law in which it would be given a narrow meaning so as to ensure that defendants are not lightly convicted”. 
Indeed, one can only hope that “any agreed definition of ‘wilful’ would not include acts or omissions which 
were merely voluntary.” (ibid.) 
70
 Cf. with this illustration: (1) D pulled the trigger of the gun intentionally (without implying that D 
intended to kill V); and (2) D intended to kill V when he pulled the trigger intentionally. See A Ashworth, 
Principles of Criminal Law, 5th ed. (Oxford University Press, 2006) at p 175, where Professor Ashworth 
argues that “[l]oose references to whether D ‘acted intentionally’ can blur this distinction”. 
71
 What Professor Hart refers to as “doing something with a further intention” – e.g. X downloaded 
infringing files intentionally/wilfully but also with the further intention/knowledge of committing an 
infringement of copyright. In other words, X did one thing with the intention/knowledge that something 
else shall occur. See HLA Hart, Punishment and Responsibility, 2nd ed. (Oxford University Press, 2008) at 
p 117 et seq. 
72
 Note that the phrase ‘strict liability’ “does not refer to an offence where no mental element exists at all: 
rather, it refers to an offence where no blameworthy mental element need be shown” (per Yong CJ in PP v 
Yong Heng Yew [1996] 3 SLR 566 at 569). See also R v Lemon [1979] AC 617, where Lord Edmund-
Davies (at p 656) opined that an offence may properly be regarded as being of strict liability even though 
mens rea is required regarding other elements of the actus reus. In other words, a strict liability offence 
may involve an actus reus element in respect of which mens rea is required. 
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copyright is strict and it matters not that the defendant had no knowledge whatsoever that 
his actions were in breach of copyright.  This is unlike civil liability for secondary 
infringements of copyright where the “innocence” of the defendant – someone who 
possesses neither actual nor constructive knowledge – is a complete defence to liability.  
However, notwithstanding that civil liability for primary copyright infringement is strict, 
should criminal liability for the same likewise be strict?  To answer this question, 
consider the legal ramifications for an “innocent” infringer of copyright.  For an 
“innocent” infringer who is faced with civil action for primary copyright infringement, 
the effects of strict liability are somewhat mitigated by the statutory limitation placed on 
the scope of the plaintiff’s relief.  The plaintiff, under such circumstances, will not be 
entitled to the remedy of damages but only to an account of profits from the defendant.73  
There is, however, no corresponding concession given to offenders who lack the mens 
rea for copyright infringement under the criminal process (i.e. those who were not aware, 
and had no reasonable grounds for suspecting, that their actions were in breach of 
copyright).74  As explained above, criminal liability under section 136(3A) – for ‘wilful’ 
infringements of copyright – is strict.  However, bearing in mind that section 136(3A) is 
an offence that is punishable with imprisonment (and not just a fine),75 would it be fair to 
impose criminal liability on copyright infringers who are “morally innocent”?76  It is 
submitted that out of fairness to the accused person charged under section 136(3A) and 
for the avoidance of doubt, Parliament should consider amending this provision by 
deleting the word ‘wilful’ and substituting it with a mens rea (fault) element which is 
similar to and consistent with that found in the other provisions of section 136 which 
prohibit secondary acts of copyright infringement – i.e. that the accused knows, or ought 
reasonably to know, that his actions constitute an infringement of copyright.77  After all, 
society should not punish, as criminal, those acts which lack the culpability or 
blameworthiness that is deserving of moral condemnation.78 
                                                 
73
 See section 119(3) of the Singapore Copyright Act 1987, and cf. section 97(1) UK CDPA 1988 and 
Article 45 of TRIPS. 
74
 For example, an infringer who is totally ignorant because he has received very little or no education, or 
someone who is intellectually impaired because of some mental disability (but who is not legally insane or 
otherwise suffering from mental disorder). 
75
 Professor Ashworth argues thus: “If there are persuasive economic and social arguments in favour of 
strict liability for minor offences … then this may be permitted so long as imprisonment is not available. 
There should be recognition of the principle that no person should be liable to imprisonment without proof 
of sufficient fault. This principle should inform the distinction between minor and non-minor offences. The 
classification of an offence as ‘regulatory’, whatever that may mean, should be irrelevant to the imposition 
of strict liability: if imprisonment is available as a sanction, then fault should be required whether it is 
called ‘regulatory’ or not” (A Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law, 5th ed. (Oxford University Press, 2006) 
at p 174; emphasis added). See, further, Article 6.02(4) of the American Law Institute’s Model Penal Code 
(Rev. Ed., 1985) – where the availability of imprisonment as a punishment should indicate that the offence 
is not meant to be one of strict liability. 
76
 Per Lord Pearce in Sweet v Parsley [1970] AC 132 at 157. 
77
 This view appears to have been shared by the author in JA Andrews, “Wilfulness: a Lesson in 
Ambiguity” (1981) 1 Legal Studies 303 at 323-324. Cf., in a more specific context, the mens rea 
requirement in section 107(2A) UK CDPA 1988 – “knows or has reason to believe”. See, further, the 
arguments raised in CL Saw and S Leong, “Defining Criminal Liability for Primary Acts of Copyright 
Infringement: The Singapore Experience” [2008] JBL 304 at 306-310. 
78
 “The criminal law is society’s most condemnatory instrument, and … respect for individual autonomy 
requires that criminal liability be imposed only where there has been choice by D. A person should not be 
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VI. Prosecution of Copyright Offences in Singapore – the exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion and the question of fairness to the accused 
 
Whilst this paper has sought to justify the legitimacy of section 136(3A), it has also been 
explained above that the provision, as drafted, may have a fairly broad reach, particularly 
with an undefined concept such as ‘wilfulness’ and the uncertainty over the meaning of 
the word ‘significant’.  What is clear, however, is that the provision may suitably be used 
to prosecute Internet users who, in a purely private and non-commercial setting, commit 
‘wilful’ infringements of copyright on a ‘significant’ scale.  It is true that Parliament 
provides the authority, tools and resources for law enforcement agents when it creates a 
criminal offence (this is criminalisation in theory), but decisions about when to invoke 
and when not to invoke these powers generally fall within the discretion of law 
enforcement officers (e.g. prosecutors).  Professor Ashworth argues that the exercise of 
such discretionary power provides the key to practical instances of criminalisation (or 
criminalisation in practice).79  Given the availability of section 136(3A) in the statute 
books and its attendant interpretational difficulties, to what extent is there public trust in 
the prosecution’s judicious exercise of discretion in this regard?  Copyright law is, after 
all, about striking a proper balance between protecting the rights of the copyright owner 
and the public interest in having reasonable access to information.  One can only hope 
that public prosecutors will take cognizance of this delicate balance and exercise good 
sense and judgment in deciding whether or not to charge an individual under section 
136(3A). 
 
There is, furthermore, an added layer of complexity to the process for prosecuting 
copyright offences in Singapore (as well as in jurisdictions which adopt a similar 
system).80  Singapore is known to have adopted a “self help” regime for the criminal 
enforcement of intellectual property rights 81  and this is by way of granting fiats to 
individual IP owners to initiate “private” prosecutions of IP offences usually in parallel 
with civil enforcement proceedings.  Prosecutions under section 136(3A), for example, 
may be brought by individual copyright owners on a fiat from the Public Prosecutor.82  
                                                                                                                                                 
censured (as distinct, perhaps, from being held civilly liable) for wrongdoing without proof of choice. This 
is a fundamental requirement of fairness to defendants.” (A Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law, 5th ed. 
(Oxford University Press, 2006) at p 166; emphasis added) 
79
 A Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law, 5th ed. (Oxford University Press, 2006) at pp 22-23. 
80
 Cf. Article 9 of the EU’s second IPR Enforcement Directive (see above) where provision is made for IP 
rights owners to actively assist the police in investigations, thus creating joint investigation teams and 
(possibly) giving rights owners greater control over criminal proceedings. 
81
 See Microsoft Corporation v SM Summit Holdings Ltd [1999] 4 SLR 529 at 547-548. 
82
 See section 336(4) of the (Singapore) Criminal Procedure Code (Cap. 68). In relation to civil proceedings 
for online copyright infringement, a copyright owner may, under procedural laws, make an application in 
court for a pre-action discovery order against a network service provider (whose subscriber is alleged to 
have committed the infringing acts in question) to compel the disclosure of the subscriber’s identity – see, 
in the Singapore context, Odex Pte Ltd v Pacific Internet Ltd [2007] SGDC 248 (District Court); [2008] 3 
SLR 18 (High Court). To obtain a similar pre-action discovery order in aid of criminal proceedings brought 
by way of a ‘private’ prosecution, the copyright owner has to rely on the inherent jurisdiction of the court 
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Herein lies an inherent risk of injustice to copyright infringers accused of contravening 
section 136(3A).  In allowing copyright owners to prosecute under a fiat, there is the 
danger that the broader public interests in the prosecution (since the criminal law is, after 
all, concerned with punishment for the benefit of the community as a whole) may be 
subjugated to the private interests of the copyright owner in obtaining a quick and 
favourable settlement of the civil enforcement action.  This potential clash of interests 
between the public and the private, arising from the conduct of (parallel) criminal and 
civil proceedings respectively, is highly undesirable in many respects, not least from the 
perspective of the defendant (accused person).83  The copyright owner (private prosecutor) 
may well use the criminal process (which includes the intimidating threat of prosecution 
of an offence that is punishable with imprisonment) to exert “pressure” – not unlike the 
notion of ‘undue influence’ in contract law – on the defendant to settle the civil action out 
of court on an expedited basis and on terms favourable to the former, in return for the 
former withdrawing or abandoning the prosecution.  Using the criminal process this way 
to bolster the copyright owner’s “bargaining strength” in the civil dispute is akin to the 
copyright owner getting de facto enforcement of his civil rights against the copyright 
infringer.84  Fortunately, proper safeguards are in place – at least in Singapore – to ensure 
that ultimate control of any prosecution by fiat remains vested in the Public Prosecutor 
and that any settlement or decision to withdraw/abandon the prosecution is subject to 
prior approval.85 
 
Other procedural complexities may also arise as a result of concurrent civil and 
criminal enforcement proceedings which may prejudice the copyright infringer.  For 
example, the copyright owner concerned may attempt to enforce a civil ‘Anton Piller’ 
order86 and execute a criminal search warrant87 contemporaneously.  As is well known, 
the grant of an ‘Anton Piller’ order, given the draconian nature of this procedural weapon, 
is subject to the stringent conditions laid down by the English Court of Appeal in Anton 
Piller KG v Mfg Processes Ltd.88  The criminal search warrant, although in many respects 
                                                                                                                                                 
as enunciated in Norwich Pharmacal Co v Customs & Excise Commissioner [1974] AC 133 and as 
extended in Ashworth Hospital Authority v MGN Ltd [2002] 1 WLR 2033. 
83
 See G Wei, The Law of Copyright in Singapore, 2nd ed. (SNP Editions, 2000) at p 986. 
84
 See, further, the views expressed in S Leong, “Pre-Action Discovery Against a Network Service Provider 
and Unmasking the John Does of Alleged Online Copyright Infringements in Singapore” [2009] EIPR 185 
at 190-191. Cf. also Yong CJ’s remarks in SM Summit Holdings Ltd v Public Prosecutor [1997] 3 SLR 922 
at 936: “In the present proceedings, it is quite clear that the criminal process was used to obtain evidence 
for pending civil proceedings; these were de facto civil proceedings.” 
85
 It appears, however, that IP rights owners are now pushing for full autonomy and control over the 
conduct (and termination) of criminal proceedings instituted under a fiat – see the AIPPI Yearbook 2002/II 
at pp 381-382. For the English position, see G Harbottle, “Private Prosecutions in Copyright Cases: should 
they be stopped?” [1998] 8 EIPR 317. 
86
 To prevent the defendant from hiding, tampering with or destroying all proof of infringement (e.g. 
infringing copies of copyright material), the plaintiff may, before the civil action goes to trial, make an 
interlocutory, ex parte application for an ‘Anton Piller’ order – an order to enter the defendant’s premises 
to inspect and seize incriminating evidence of infringement. 
87
 A criminal search warrant is issued by the court pursuant to section 136(9) of the Singapore Copyright 
Act 1987. 
88
 [1976] Ch 55 at 61-62. Further safeguards governing the grant and enforcement of such orders have been 
incorporated by the courts in recent years as a result of fears of possible abuse by applicants of the 
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similar to an ‘Anton Piller’ order, is governed by different rules and procedures in the 
criminal process.  It should be noted that many of the safeguards in the manner in which 
‘Anton Piller’ orders are obtained have not been included in the criminal process.  As 
such, a copyright owner who is in control of both the civil suit and the criminal 
prosecution must be mindful that the ‘Anton Piller’ order should not take on the guise of 
a criminal search warrant, and vice versa.  It is also generally not desirable to enforce an 
‘Anton Piller’ order and execute a criminal search warrant contemporaneously, 
particularly from the perspective of the copyright infringer (defendant/accused) who may 
otherwise be confused and prejudiced by the entire process.89  Finally, there is also the 
unresolved issue of full and frank disclosure.  When a copyright owner applies for an ex 
parte ‘Anton Piller’ order, there is a duty imposed on him to make full and frank 
disclosure of all material facts, including facts which are not in his favour.  There is, 
however, no corresponding duty imposed by statute on the copyright owner – who now 
assumes the role of a private prosecutor – in an application for a criminal search warrant.  
The question therefore remains as to whether a private complainant who elects to 
prosecute a copyright offence under a fiat should likewise be subject to the duty of full 
and frank disclosure when applying for a criminal search warrant.90  Insofar as protecting 
the interests of the copyright infringer is concerned, the real danger in all of this is that 
“the carefully worked out limitations and safeguards developed in civil law to control ex 
parte Anton Piller orders may be circumvented by resort to criminal search warrants”.91 
 
 
VII. Conclusion 
 
With advancements in technology, the ease of copying will only escalate, as will the 
individual instances of online piracy.  Just as the ubiquitous copyright pirate of yesteryear 
has not been totally eradicated (some of whom may have gone further underground or 
gone online instead), online copyright infringers (both uploaders and downloaders alike) 
will not disappear anytime soon.  If anything, they are likely to multiply in numbers, 
especially amongst the younger generation.  This is a generation that has grown up with 
and has become accustomed to digital forms of entertainment (whether in music, film, 
software or computer games) as well as the comforts of mobile and Internet technology.  
However, just because we cannot stem the tide of technological development, this does 
not mean that we should condone the manner in which Internet users obtain and deal with 
copyright works.  Regulation and control in this field are more essential now than ever 
before. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
procedure (e.g. where the ‘Anton Piller’ order is used as an instrument of oppression). See Universal 
Themosensors v Hibben [1992] 3 All ER 257; Columbia Picture Industries v Robinson [1986] 3 All ER 338. 
89
 See, further, G Wei, The Law of Copyright in Singapore, 2nd ed. (SNP Editions, 2000) at pp 906-909. 
90
 See Yong CJ’s remarks in SM Summit Holdings Ltd v Public Prosecutor [1997] 3 SLR 922 at 936: “… 
The same cannot be said of private individuals making complaints. The very rationale for full and frank 
disclosure in civil proceedings would apply with equal force. If the terms of the provisions [for search 
warrants] are reconsidered by Parliament, it may be desirable that Parliament impose a duty of full and 
frank disclosure in cases where search warrants are sought by private complainants.” 
91
 G Wei, The Law of Copyright in Singapore, 2nd ed. (SNP Editions, 2000) at p 986. 
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It is quite likely that civil remedies alone have proven insufficient to adequately 
protect the economic interests of copyright owners, who have lobbied long and hard for 
the introduction of new copyright offences.  The general impression is that the criminal 
process is viewed by IP rights owners as a more effective means of securing their 
economic viability – in particular, the censuring role of the criminal law in stigmatising 
conduct that society wants to punish.  A civil wrongdoer does not suffer the same moral 
condemnation from society as one who is also convicted of a crime.  Furthermore, it has 
been highlighted that the current behaviour of online users, if left unchecked, will pose a 
serious threat to the value system inherent in the whole concept of intellectual property.  
It involves a direct undermining of the proprietary regime.  Criminalisation may therefore 
be necessary in cases where the wrongful conduct affects the well-being of society and 
threatens a valued proprietary regime.  Yet, the impetus for further criminalisation in the 
sphere of IP infringement must be properly and carefully justified. 
 
This paper has sought to explain why it is entirely appropriate – based upon 
arguments of principle – to impose criminal liability on primary infringers of copyright in 
the online environment, even if the infringements were committed for private and non-
commercial purposes.  The enactment of section 136(3A) in the Singapore Copyright Act 
1987 is, in this author’s view, most timely and eminently justified on the basis of the 
harm principle, ethics and morality, as well as the deterrent and retributive theories.  
There is also no escaping from the fact that uploading and downloading infringing files 
are acts of infringement akin to stealing in all but name, particularly at the conceptual 
level.  Such forms of property violation are morally indistinguishable.  In the same 
manner that the law of theft punishes a thief, the use of the criminal law to punish 
(especially recalcitrant) online infringers of copyright should come as no surprise.  It has, 
of course, been acknowledged by this author that section 136(3A), as drafted, is not 
entirely free of ambiguity.  There remain difficulties with interpretation and the paper has, 
accordingly, offered some suggestions for future statutory reform.  Finally, in a criminal 
justice system which allows for the “private” prosecution of copyright offences, the 
question has been raised as to whether adequate safeguards are in place to ensure that the 
accused person does not suffer any injustice or oppression. 
 
Beyond this, it may further be rationalised that the criminalisation of such 
wrongful behaviour in the digital environment was legislatively endorsed as a “last 
resort”.92  The ultimate objective in persuading Netizens to respect copyright in online 
works would have been very difficult, if not impossible, to attain without resorting to 
criminal punishment. 93   Indeed, it appears that all other avenues (including “softer” 
options) have been exhausted with little success, if any.  We should therefore regard 
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 See CMV Clarkson, HM Keating and SR Cunningham, Clarkson and Keating Criminal Law: Text and 
Materials, 6th ed. (Thomson Sweet & Maxwell, 2007) at p 4 (cited at note 18, above). 
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 See D Husak, “The Criminal Law as Last Resort” (2004) 24 OJLS 207 at 212. The main difficulty with a 
platform such as the Internet is this: “The core ethos, and success, of the Internet to date lies in its ability to 
stimulate shared ideas and content. It also promotes participation, pro-activity and creativity …” (see 
section 3.2 of Lord Carter’s interim report on Digital Britain released on 29 January 2009). The inclusive/ 
permissive culture on the Internet is further exacerbated by the revolutionary development of the Creative 
Commons (http://creativecommons.org/) and the Open Source software movement 
(http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/gpl.html). 
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section 136(3A) as part of a larger suite of measures – a multi-pronged approach – aimed 
at combating the rising tide of non-commercial (but ‘significant’) infringements of 
copyright in the online environment.  It is now time to use the “stick” in the ongoing 
battle against online piracy, no matter how unpopular or inelegant this measure may seem.  
The multi-pronged approach, as envisaged by this author, may be summarised thus: 
 
(1) Rigorous and effective enforcement of copyright 
 
The mere provision of section 136(3A), amongst other offences, in copyright legislation 
will be futile without an accompanying scheme of enforcement that is rigorous and robust.  
The relevant authorities (whether copyright owners or the State Prosecution Service) 
must identify those egregious and incorrigible offenders (who simply refuse to stop their 
illegal online activities) and take decisive legal action against them, including prosecution 
where appropriate.  There should also be greater publicity given to successful 
enforcement cases in the media, particularly in underscoring the remedies and/or penalty 
awarded against the copyright infringer. 
 
To date, however, there has only been one reported case in Singapore concerning 
the prosecution of two private individuals for having distributed, in a non-commercial 
context, hundreds of unauthorised MP3 files via an Internet chat programme.  They were 
subsequently sentenced to jail for three months (the accused who distributed almost 300 
music files) and four months (the accused who distributed over 600 music files) 
respectively.94   Over in the US, a federal jury in Minneapolis recently ruled against 
Jammie Thomas-Rasset for having ‘wilfully’ violated music copyrights in 24 songs in the 
country’s only file-sharing case (out of over 30,000 similar cases) to have gone to trial.  It 
was widely reported in the media that the defendant was ordered to pay US$1.92 million 
(or US$80,000 per song) in damages to the recording industry. 95   The RIAA has, 
however, made it clear that it has stopped filing lawsuits against private individuals and is 
now working with Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to tackle the problem of online 
piracy.96 
 
It is, in this author’s view, as yet unclear if this is the right strategy to adopt for 
the future.  Commentators have argued, quite rightly, that the deterrent effect of the 
criminal law depends very much on “the likelihood of detection of infringement, the 
likelihood of criminal proceedings being brought, and of the imposition of imprisonment 
as a sanction”.97  It is therefore submitted that rigorous enforcement of the criminal law 
which dramatically increases the rate of detection and the subsequent prosecution and 
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 See The Straits Times, 14 January 2006 (at p 3) and 18 February 2006 (at p H3). Note, however, that the 
accused in this case were charged under section 136(3)(b), and not section 136(3A), of the Copyright Act 
1987. The only reported decision to date of a prosecution under section 136(3A) involved a company which 
had infringed copyright in computer software for the purpose of obtaining a ‘commercial advantage’: see 
PP v PDM International Pte Ltd [2006] SGDC 91. 
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 See http://www.siliconvalley.com/news/ci_12620804?nclick_check=1. 
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 See http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-10203799-93.html and http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-
10204047-93.html. 
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 C Tapper, “Criminality and copyright”, chapter 19 in Intellectual Property in the New Millennium, D 
Vaver and L Bently, Gen. Eds. (Cambridge University Press, 2004) at p 278. 
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punishment of the offender can have profound influence on human behaviour and crime 
rate generally.  Lax or selective enforcement may instead bring the criminal law into 
disrepute and result in the public losing confidence in and respect for the criminal justice 
system.  Accordingly, as long as the criminal provisions in the copyright statute are 
enforced with some regularity, the existence of the criminal law backed by sanctions 
serves as a “standing disincentive to crime”.98 
 
(2) Innovative business models 
 
The entertainment industry as a whole must eat humble pie and not give the public the 
impression that they are just large, greedy and monopolistic business conglomerates, 
particularly in these economically trying times.  There is an urgent need for the industry 
to respond to changing customer demands and consumer expectations and to reach out to 
the wider (online) public by growing the audience and winning their trust.  In this regard, 
the industry should engage in continuous innovation to develop alternative business 
models and market-based strategies which are economically sustainable and which 
increase consumer options in the digital marketplace – e.g. new royalty payment systems 
or collective licensing schemes; to introduce variable pricing or price cuts, new and 
convenient ways of acquiring entertainment products and creative forms of advertising 
and marketing.99 
 
To be fair, the industry, whilst slow to respond, has not rested on its laurels and 
has begun to understand and adapt to the present psyche of 21st century Netizens.  Two 
examples from the music and software industries are worth citing.  A new business 
partnership between Universal Music Group and Virgin Media was widely reported in the 
press in June 2009.100  To encourage people to pay for online music rather than to turn to 
illegal file-sharing, Virgin Media customers will be able to download as much music as 
they like for a small monthly fee, which can then be played on iPods or any other MP3 
player, mobile phones and computers.  Universal will, in turn, offer its entire catalogue of 
works and the music will come free of DRM.  New measures have also been introduced 
by the Intellectual Property Office of Singapore and the local software industry to 
encourage companies (especially SMEs) to obtain legitimate software for their business 
operations.101  If these companies were to run voluntary audit checks on their computer 
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 Per A Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law, 5th ed. (Oxford University Press, 2006) at p 16. There have 
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systems and purge all pirated software material, they will get discounts on legitimate 
software products.  In addition, they will not face legal action from the relevant copyright 
owners (at least in the first instance) even if such audits root out bootleg versions.  These 
measures, backed by the Business Software Alliance, have been described as a “soft 
touch” way to promote the use of original software in business. 
 
(3) Working together with ISPs 
 
Copyright owners (particularly those in the entertainment industry) must cultivate a good 
working relationship with ISPs – their “partners” in copyright enforcement.  For example, 
ISPs can, on receipt of a court order, assist in revealing the identity of their subscribers 
who have been accused of online infringements of copyright,102 and can also assist in the 
smooth implementation of the “notice and take-down” mechanism provided for in 
copyright legislation.103  More recently, ISPs have been accorded greater responsibility in 
two new initiatives – one in conjunction with the “three-strikes-and-you-are-out” (or 
“graduated response”) policy that is currently the subject of considerable debate in 
several jurisdictions,104 and the other arising from the final Digital Britain report that was 
published recently.105 
 
(4) Education/Indoctrination in the form of moral persuasion 
 
A slew of educational initiatives have been developed by WIPO,106 RIAA107 and the 
Copyright Society of the USA (CSUSA). 108   Similar programmes are available in 
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Singapore.109  Yet, one part of Internet culture (probably a large part) advocates that there 
is no social stigma associated with illegal file-sharing and downloading, unlike the 
stealing of an actual CD from a retail shop.  In what respect has education in IP fallen 
short? 
 
Insofar as education/indoctrination is concerned, respect for IP as a whole – just 
like respect for any other form of property, real or personal – must be deeply ingrained in 
the human psyche as an intrinsic moral value that is as fundamental as, say, honesty and 
integrity.110  A full appreciation and understanding of copyright law’s normative role in 
this regard is crucial – that copyright is rooted in some deeper understanding of society’s 
regard for creativity, property, economic efficiency and fundamental notions of justice 
and fairness.  There must be social acceptance (or social “buy-in”) of copyright’s 
legitimacy, particularly in the online environment.  It is therefore suggested that the 
moral/ethical justifications for criminalising ‘wilful’ infringements of copyright on a 
‘significant’ scale be further underscored in educational endeavours so that the public 
understands the root of the problem.  Just as property rights reside in a physical CD/DVD, 
property rights (albeit intangible in nature) exist too on the Internet (as they do, 
apparently, in the virtual world of Second Life).  The public needs to understand that 
downloading an unauthorised MP3 file is – from both the conceptual and moral 
perspective – no different from stealing a CD single from a friend.  It is a clear sign of 
human weakness, where succumbing to temptation is far easier and more convenient than 
taking the moral high road whenever the alternatives present themselves simultaneously – 
legal but $0.99 per song, or illegal and free.  The choice cannot be more obvious.  It is 
high time that consumers of entertainment exercise greater moral responsibility over their 
online attitudes and behaviour. 
 
 We know that society generally accepts, without question, the existence of 
criminal laws which protect tangible property – e.g. laws against theft, robbery and 
burglary.  There is, in this respect, a shared sense/understanding of what is right and 
wrong.  How then do we strive to achieve such a consensus in thinking in relation to 
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intangible property rights?  How can we address the incongruity in the public’s 
perception of right and wrong on the Internet? 
 
“Governing people, in the broad meaning of the word, governing people is not a 
way to force people to do what the governor wants; it is always a versatile 
equilibrium, with complementarity and conflicts between techniques which assure 
coercion and processes through which the self is constructed or modified by 
himself.”111 
 
It is hoped that a dynamic but versatile implementation of the multi-pronged approach 
outlined above will effect, over time, a mindset or behavioural change in all Netizens.  
Regulators and copyright owners, on the one hand, must acknowledge and validate the 
“free-sharing” culture of the Internet, whilst consumers of online entertainment must, on 
the other hand, appreciate and understand the “fee-charging” culture of commercial 
copyright and cultivate a shared ethos that values creative works on the Internet.  The fact 
remains that online content is not always for free and that the Internet is not and can 
never be “a lawless Wild West without boundaries”.112 
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